Suchergebnisse

This is the 14. article in our series Trouble on the­ Far-Right. country's domestically weak far right has managed to send its representatives to the European Parliament (EP). Prior to 2014, these MEPs remained largely isolated, retaining a non-affiliated status. Initially, Volen Siderov's far right party Attack, the first of its kind in post-communist Bulgaria, won three seats in the legislative body in 2007. Formed in 2005, Attack quickly gained electoral support, conveying a strong xenophobic and anti-minority rhetoric combined with emphasis on Orthodox Christian values and opposition to globalization. No other Bulgarian party has previously sought to attract voters using such a strategy. Attack participated in the short-lived Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty group in the EP. Further efforts for constructing a lasting political grouping on the far right with the participation of Bulgarian parties remained futile, making their influence on debate-shaping and decision-making hardly possible. Winning a seat less in 2009, Attack remained outside of any recognized EP political group.

Four main strategies of social democratic competition can be distinguished when the official party positions on salient political issues are compared with the positions of core voter groups on the same issues: 1) Corbynism (Left-wing economic polarisation); 2) Macronism (pro-market economic polarisation coupled with culturally progressive/libertarian stances); 3) Progressive-libertarian distancing (the adoption of moderate economic stances with culturally progressive policies) and 4) Catch-all (traditional social democratic centrism). The results from the European countries included in the study show that, with regard to the relative positioning of social democratic parties visà-vis their core voter groups, the most beneficial strategies, in terms of electoral appeal, are the traditional social-democratic catch-all strategy of moderation along both the economic and cultural dimensions, as well as the Corbynist strategy of polarisation along the economic dimension.

AbstractThis article seeks to explain why electoral support for the Venezuelan opposition has increased substantially, using Venezuelan public opinion survey data from LAPOP and an opt-in sample collected through the online vote advice application Brújula Presidencial Venezuela. It analyzes why Venezuelans who had either voted for Chávez or abstained in 2006 defected and started to support the opposition in subsequent elections. It proposes several reasons: negative voter evaluations of the economy, concern for public safety, and dissatisfaction with Venezuelan democracy. While the finding that negative policy evaluations boost support for the opposition aligns with theoretical expectations, this study finds a strong relationship between having different evaluations of the quality of democracy and supporting Chávez, which shows that the advocacy of two competing visions of democracy by the incumbent and the opposition also affects voting patterns in Venezuela.

This study compares the spatial positioning of over 200 political parties across 28 European Union (EU) member states intwo cross-national voting advice applications (VAAs) developed for the 2014 European elections: EUvox and euandi. Wefind that the two VAAs show highly similar results in terms of party positioning on the cultural liberal-conservative andpro-anti EU dimensions, while economic left–right placements converge less, especially concerning right-wing parties. Ouranalyses reveal that the higher overlap on the cultural and EU dimensions is a result, at least partially, of the inclusion ofsimilar items used to measure these concepts, while most of the systematic divergence between the two VAAs in left–right placements stems from problematic issue-statements used in the dimensional calculations. We demonstrate howcertain items can cause bias in the placements of specific party families by (1) not aligning with other statements thatmeasure the same latent construct; (2) tapping into other latent constructs, in addition to the one they are supposed tomeasure; and (3) not inducing sufficient polarization between parties

This study compares the spatial positioning of over 200 political parties across 28 European Union (EU) member states in two cross-national voting advice applications (VAAs) developed for the 2014 European elections: EUvox and euandi. We find that the two VAAs show highly similar results in terms of party positioning on the cultural liberal-conservative and pro-anti EU dimensions, while economic left–right placements converge less, especially concerning right-wing parties. Our analyses reveal that the higher overlap on the cultural and EU dimensions is a result, at least partially, of the inclusion of similar items used to measure these concepts, while most of the systematic divergence between the two VAAs in left–right placements stems from problematic issue-statements used in the dimensional calculations. We demonstrate how certain items can cause bias in the placements of specific party families by (1) not aligning with other statements that measure the same latent construct; (2) tapping into other latent constructs, in addition to the one they are supposed to measure; and (3) not inducing sufficient polarization between parties.

Institutional and political distrust are often associated with the improved electoral performance of extremist parties. This study analyses to what extent political distrust and Euroscepticism are associated with extreme left and right ideological positions. We specifically examine voters in the Netherlands – a country with wide array of political parties spanning a broad ideological spectrum. The study utilises probability samples from the Dutch National Election Survey and the European Election Studies, as well as opt-in samples collected through Vote Advice Applications (VAAs), amounting to a total of 20,548 analysed respondents. By employing hierarchical regression analyses, we find that across multiple elections at the national and European level, both radical left and radical right respondents are more prone to be politically distrustful and Eurosceptic, than respondents who profess a centrist political ideology. In addition, our analyses suggest that distrust and Euroscepticism can be explained by respondents' party preference.

This article utilises large-N panel data to compare two theories of referendum voting behaviour in order to understand the 'for' or 'against' vote in the 2016 Dutch referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. It studies the extent to which voting behaviour was predicted by Eurosceptic attitudes and fear of upsetting Russia (issue-based theory), versus dissatisfaction with the Dutch government and general political discontent (second-order theory). Our findings indicate that issue-based determinants predict the referendum vote better than second-order predictors. However, Eurosceptic attitudes and government satisfaction both outperform concerns about the relationship with Russia as a predictor. We thus provide evidence that the issue-based and second-order approaches to explain voting in EU referendums are complementary, but not equal in explanatory strength.

Die amerikanischen Demokraten sind sich in einem Punkt einig: Die Trump-Präsidentschaft muss eine einmalige Sache bleiben. Während das breite demokratische Kandidatenfeld um die Nominierung für die Präsidentschaftswahl ringt, steht für viele Expert_innen und Wähler_innen die Frage der »Wählbarkeit« im Fokus. Viele halten die Überlegung, wer Donald Trump am ehesten besiegen könnte, für wichtiger als die politische Agenda der Kandidat_innen. In unserer Analyse stellen wir die ideologischen Positionen der sechs vielversprechendsten demokratischen Kandidat_innen sowie Donald Trumps in einem zweiachsigen politischen Spektrum dar. Wir zeigen, dass die der Spaltung in gemäßigte und radikale Kandidat_innen zugrundeliegende Differenz nicht ausschließlich auf ihrem Führungsstil basiert: Die Positionierung der Kandidat_innen zu 30 thematischen Punkten zeigt einen tiefen politischen Graben innerhalb der Demokratischen Partei. Da sich oberflächlich betrachtet die Wahlprogramme der Kandidat_innen stark ähneln, haben wir uns besonders auf Themen fokussiert, die die Unterschiede – auch unter denen mit sich scheinbar überschneidenden Programmen – deutlich machen. Diese Methode bringt es mit sich, dass die Nähe der demokratischen Kandidat_innen zu den rechtskonservativen Ansichten Donald Trumps etwas überspitzt dargestellt wird.

Four main strategies of social democratic competition can be distinguished when the official party positions on salient political issues are compared with the positions of core voter groups on the same issues: 1) Corbynism (Left-wing economic polarisation); 2) Macronism (pro-market economic polarisation coupled with culturally progressive/libertarian stances); 3) Progressive-libertarian distancing (the adoption of moderate economic stances with culturally progressive policies) and 4) Catch-all (traditional social democratic centrism). The results from the European countries included in the study show that, with regard to the relative positioning of social democratic parties visà-vis their core voter groups, the most beneficial strategies, in terms of electoral appeal, are the traditional social-democratic catch-all strategy of moderation along both the economic and cultural dimensions, as well as the Corbynist strategy of polarisation along the economic dimension.

Vergleicht man die offiziellen Positionen sozialdemokratischer Parteien zu zentralen politischen Themen mit den Positionen ihrer wichtigsten Wählergruppen zu diesen Themen, so lassen sich vier sozialdemokratische Kernstrategien unterscheiden: 1) Corbynismus (linksökonomische Polarisierung); 2) Macronismus (marktfreundliche ökonomische Polarisierung kombiniert mit progressiven/libertären Positionen in kulturellen Fragen); 3) progressiv-libertäre Distanzierung (moderate ökonomische Positionen verbunden mit progressiver Politik auf der kulturellen Achse) und 4) catch all (traditioneller sozialdemokratischer Zentrismus). In den hier analysierten europäischen Ländern haben sich mit Blick auf die relative Positionierung sozialdemokratischer Parteien zu ihren wichtigsten Wählergruppen zwei Strategien als am geeignetsten erwiesen, um Wählerstimmen zu maximieren: die traditionelle Catch-all-Strategie, die entlang der ökonomischen sowie der kulturellen Achse auf gemäßigte Positionen setzt, sowie Corbyns Strategie der ökonomischen Polarisierung.

The result of the referendum in the United Kingdom in 2016 to leave the European Union sparked much interest on the socio-economic characteristics of 'Brexiters'. In this article we challenge the popularised view of the Leave voter as an outsider and find that individuals from an intermediate class, whose malaise is due to a declining financial position, represent an important segment of the Brexit vote. We use individual-level data from a post-Brexit survey based on the British Election Study. Our analysis tests three predictive models. First, although our analysis confirms the negative association between education and Leave vote, we find that voting Leave is associated more with intermediate levels of education than with low or absent education, in particular in the presence of a perceived declining economic position. Secondly, we find that Brexiters hold distinct psycho-social features of malaise due to declining economic conditions, rather than anxiety or anger. Thirdly, our exploratory model finds voting Leave associated with self-identification as middle class, rather than with working class. We also find that intermediate levels of income were not more likely to vote for remain than low income groups. Overall our analysis of the Brexit vote underlines the importance of considering the political behaviour of the declining middle.